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I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant and Cross Respondent Investor Recovery Fund, LLC (“Investor Recovery”)
submits the following points and authorities in Reply to the response of Respondents and Cross
Appellants and in reply to their Cross Appeal.
II.

ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Not “Ignore” Investor Recovery’s Statement of the Case.
Appellate Rule 35 outlines the requirements for briefs on appeal. A “statement of the case”
is to provide “a concise statement of the facts.” I.A.R. 35(a)(3)(iii). The “argument” portion of the
brief provides for the contentions of the appellant “with citations to . . . parts of the transcript and
record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6). The case relied upon by Hopkins Associates, Woods v.
Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 244 P.3d 197 (2010) says nothing to alter these rules.
Investor Recovery provided a concise statement of facts in its statement of the case in order
to provide the Court with an overview. While the entire trial transcript and record supports the
statement of facts, the critical facts to the discussion are identified in the argument portion of
Investor Recovery’s opening brief, with citations to the transcript or record. The brief complies
with the rules. Where there were broad citations to the testimony of certain witnesses, such citation
was made because the witness testimony was not overly long, and it seemed that the full testimony
of the witness was necessary in order to understand the foundation and context of the statements.
Notwithstanding, the attached Appendix to this brief focuses and consolidates the evidence of
Investor Recovery’s prima facie claim, and provides narrower “sound bite” citations. There is no
reason to “ignore” the statement of the case.
B. The District Court Erred Entering Directed Verdict on Investor Recovery’s Fraud
Claims because There Was Sufficient Evidence For a Jury to Find Randy and Brian
Committed Fraud.
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY AND RESPONSE BRIEF
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It is

worth repeating that this appeal challenges the District Court’s entry 0f directed verdict

dismissing fraud claims before a jury could evaluate and weigh the evidence.

As

should not engage in any weighing 0f the evidence. Rather, the evidence

presumed

Investor Recovery

that evidence.

(2014).

As

See

such,

no consequence

is

entitled to “every legitimate inference” in

e.g.

it is

April Beguesse, Inc.

v.

its

is

such, this Court

true,

and

favor that can be drawn from

Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 509, 328 P.3d 480, 489

of n0 consequence that there

that different conclusions could

may be conﬂicting evidence.

Likewise,

be reached from the evidence.

it is

of

The Hopkins

Associates response emphasizes the existence 0f arguably competing evidence and possible
alternative interpretations 0f the evidence, but does not establish that Investor Recovery’s evidence

was inadequate,

as a matter of law, to support fraud claims.

This case does, admittedly, become conﬁlsing because 0f the long timeline, multiple
people, and complicated subject matter.

In order t0 assist With the evaluation 0f the case, the

attached Appendix lays out a timeline of key factual conclusions and the primary evidentiary bases
for those conclusions.

Although the outline plainly Views the evidence in a

Investor Recovery, that

Appendix

illustrates the

is

What

is

required

by the

standard. Distilled to

its

light

most favorable

t0

most simple terms, the

following timeline established by the evidence:

DATE
July

1,

—
2005 —

Aug.

FACT: Investors invest
actual discretion to

in

fund

when managers

did not have

deny investment withdrawal requests.

1,

2008

Aug.

2008

1,

FACT: Fund circumstances change because ”sufficient

debenture holders [gave] notice of redemption
.to cause
Management .to have concern for the liquidity of the Issuer
.

.

.

.

and parity treatment among

all

debenture holders.” At that

time, the fund managers gained the actual discretion to deny

withdrawal requests.
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Aug.

FACT: Randy, Brian and Hopkins Financial intentionally hide the

2007-Dec.

fact that the

2007.

suspend withdrawals from the investors.

Aug.

FACT: The

ability to

2007-Dec.

investors.

If

2007.

with Brian, they would and could have withdrawn

Fund Management has gained the authority to

withdraw their money was important to the

they learned that right was at

risk

when they met
all

of their

money.

Feb. 29,

FACT: At investor meeting Hopkins Associates mention, but

2008

dismiss the possibility of a moratorium by intentionally making
false assurances to investors that the

honoring

Mar.

1,

will

continue

redemption requests.

all

FACT: Fund

Fund

management

effectively

stopped giving

full

2008 —

redemptions after February 29, 2008. As of that date, there was

forward

no longer any way for investors to avoid

This timeline and the evidence cited in the Appendix

is

not to be Viewed apart from the other

evidence outlined and listed in Investor Recovery’s opening
for the evidence,

and make

it

clearer

Why the

The Hopkins Associates argue

District

may be room t0

brief.

Court was in

Rather,

it is

t0 provide context

error.

that the evidence does not establish that the omissions

caused the investors t0 forgo withdrawing their
“Fund”). While there

injury.

money from

the

debate the evidence, there

is

Hopkins Northwest Fund

(the

undoubtedly evidence that the

omissions caused the investors to forgo withdrawing their money. This was not a case where the
investors

were uninvolved With

their investment. Rather, they invested

based 0n the promise they

could have liquidity. In Fall 0f 2007 they speciﬁcally asked the Hopkins Associates t0 conﬁrm
they could withdraw the money. The Hopkins Associates
risks that the investors could not

Withdraw

investors could not otherwise discover.

their

knew at the time of the meetings that the

money had

By hiding

increased for speciﬁc reasons that the

that information, they caused the investors to

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY AND RESPONSE BRIEF
—

PAGE 7

leave their

money

in the Fund,

which they would not have done

if they

knew

the truth.

The

later

reference t0 the possibility 0f a “moratorium” at the February meeting did not reveal the fraud. In

any event, by

that time,

The evidence

loss.

it

was too

late,

and the investors were already assured

establishes a causal link

Neither the Bryant Motors nor the
material bearing

P.2d 683

(Ct.

0n

this appeal.

The evidence

In Bryant

Motors

Inc.

had already incurred the

in this case is that the material

v.

Am States Ins.

loss.

That

is

146 (2012) for

its

When the

after

omission changed the actions of the investors
is

at

relevant in this case.

153 Idaho 119, 280 P.3d

As previously noted,

fraudulent statement after the fact

the omissions during the Fall

investors could avoid injury.

It

A

is

of no

2007 meetings did occur at a time

0 ’Shea does nothing more than address different evidence

does not provide any support for the District Court’s dismissal of this case.

The “Holder Claim” Exception Does Not Apply to Actions

for Idaho

Common Law

Fraud.

1.

The “Holder Claim

”

Exception Pertains

t0 Different

Law from Different Jurisdictions

1The only arguable signiﬁcance 0f 0 ’Shea would be With respect to the February 2008 meeting. The Hopkins
Associates again omitted the fact of the actual present existing conditions allowing imposition of a moratorium, but
at that date,

it

was too

late for

any investors

t0

is based upon
deny the jury the opportunity to

avoid injury. However, because even that point

arguably conﬂicting interpretations 0f the evidence,

it

would be improper

to

consider the impact 0f the February 2008 meeting.
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a

observation that an act fraudulently inducing a party t0 contract must, obviously,

in a different case.

C.

was made

not the Investor Recovery case.

0 ’Shea v. High Mark Dev. LLC,

occur before the party enters the contract.
consequence.

800

C0., 118 Idaho 796,

false statement that

when they could have avoided harm. Nothing about Bryant Motors

The Hopkins Associates point t0

injuries.

0 ’Shea cases cited by the Hopkins Associates have any

App. 1990), the Court of Appeals addressed a

the recipient 0f the statement

time

between the omissions and the

t0 suffer ﬁnancial

1

“Holder Claims” generally arise in a securities law context when stockholders allege that
a corporation wrongfully induced them t0 continue holding onto an investment. See,

Thornton

LLP

v.

Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 926 (TeX. 2010); Small

C0s., Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 173, 132 Cal. Rptr.

Grant

e.g.,

v.

Fritz

2d 490, 494, 65 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2003). These

claims almost exclusively relate t0 stockholders 0f publicly traded corporations registered as
securities

under With the Securities Exchange Commission. See,

Drug Stores, 421

e.g.,

Blue Chip Stamps

U.S. 723, 727, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1921 (1975); Holmes

v.

v.

Manor

Grubman, 286 Ga. 636,

637, 691 S.E.2d 196, 197-98 (2010) (allowing a “holders claim” against a publicly traded
corporation t0 proceed under state law);

AHWInv.

P'ship

v.

CtiiGroup

Inc.,

980

F.

Supp. 2d 5 10,

521 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting a “holders claim” against a publicly traded corporation”).

Some

states

allow holders claims t0 proceed under state securities law while others do not?

Although some courts

may

dismiss both a “holders claim” and a

common law

simultaneously, these Courts distinguish between the elements of statutory and
claims. See e.g. Deutsche

5815,

at

*33 (N.D.

Ill.

Bank Nat'l

Jan. 19, 2016);

Tr.

C0.

Holmes

C

fraud claim

common law

5225, 2016 U.S. Dist.

v.

Cannon, N0. 12

v.

Grubman, 286 Ga. 636, 639, 691 S.E.2d

LEXIS

196, 199

(2010).

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 738 n.9, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1927 (1975), prohibited “holders claims” under Rule 10b-5. However,
the holding in Blue Chip dismissed potential stockholders claims that they lost potential proﬁts

failing to

by

purchase a stock based upon an inaccurate prospectus. The court explicitly declined t0

See Universal Inv. Advisory SA v. Bakrie Telecom PTE, Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 5063 1(U), 1] 7, 51 Misc. 3d 1212(A),
37 N.Y.S.3d 209 (Sup. Ct.) (discussing the split in New York law on allowing holders claims); Holmes v. Grubman,
286 Ga. 636, 640-41, 691 S.E.2d 196, 200 (2010) (allowing holders claims to proceed and explicitly identifying the
difference between an action under a state’s securities statute and a common law fraud claim); Small v. Fritz C0s.,
Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 182, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 501, 65 P.3d 1255, 1264 (2003) (allowing holders claims based upon
2

public policy); Gutman v. Howard Sav. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 264 (D.N.J. 1990); Grant Thornton LLP
High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 930 (TeX. 2010).

v.

Prospect
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bar state law claims of the same nature.
t0 the extent that

Id. at

738 n.9 (“Obviously

this

disadvantage

remedies are available t0 non-purchasers and non-sellers under

is

attenuated

state

law”).

“Blue Chip Stamps limited securities fraud claims under section 10(b) 0f the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934

to those involving the actual purchase 0r sales

0f securities, but, in

home in state court for holder claims involving common-law fraud.” Starr Found.
Ina, 2010

NY Slip Op 4526,

States in the Paciﬁc

13,

76 A.D.3d 25, 41, 901 N.Y.S.2d 246, 258 (App. Div.)

ﬁmds and companies

(dissent).

Other Cases Dismissing Fraud for Lack 0f Causation d0 Not Warrant a Per Se Exclusion
”
ofAll Investment Fraud Cases as “Holder Claims

an example of Why

this

would have made no

just

that,

under those particular

difference because the losses

purported omission. 975 F.2d

it

at 1374.

by

cite t0

1992)

common law

fraud.

facts, the

omitted information

had already occurred by the time of the

facts

0f that case. Moreover, those facts are not the

Investor Recovery in this case, so the

The Hopkins Associates

(8th Cir.

975 F.2d 1370

That court did not categorically reject investment fraud

afﬁrmed a dismissal based on the

as presented

Dstrib. Scis., Ina,

Court should create a “holder claim” exception t0

That case established nothing more

same

Int'l Grp.,

before, but have not stylized these suits as “holder

The Hopkins Associates argue that Arem‘ v.

cases,

Am.

3

claims.”

is

v.

open a

Northwest and Intermountain West have encountered fraudulent omission

cases against investment

2.

11

dicta, left

many

8th

Circuit decision has

no relevance.

cases with parenthetical references to give the

appearance 0f broad support for a categorical exclusion 0f any investor fraud claims. However,

3

See Universal Inv. Advisory SA

v.

Bakrz'e

Telecom PTE,

Ltd.,

2016

NY Slip Op 5063 1(U),

1]

7, 5

New York law 0n allowing holders

1

it

Misc. 3d

Holmes v.
Grubman, 286 Ga. 636, 640-41, 691 S.E.Zd 196, 200 (2010) (allowing holders claims to proceed and explicitly
identifying the difference between an action under a state’s securities statute and a common law fraud claim); Small
v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 167, 182, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 501, 65 P.3d 1255, 1264 (2003) (allowing holders
claims based upon public policy); Gutman v. Howard Sav. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 264 (D.N.J. 1990); Grant
Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 3 14 S.W.3d 913, 930 (Tex. 2010).
1212(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 209 (Sup. Ct.) (discussing the

split in

claims);
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appears they are attempting to extract too broad a rule from cases that are decided primarily on
their own discrete facts. For instance, Hopkins Associates cite Chanoff v. United States Surgical
Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Conn. 1994) for a proposition that the plaintiffs claims based on a
failure to sell stock were too speculative. In that case, however, that actual analysis was that
damage claims based on a hypothetical sale was a claim for lost profits that needed to be proven
with “reasonable certainty.” 857 F. Supp. at 1018. In that case, there simply wasn’t sufficient
evidence to prove potential market value of the stock beyond speculation. That is a critical
distinction from the Investor Recovery case, where the payment was defined. Moreover, the fact
that the Charnoff case recognizes the rule that lost profits need to be proven beyond speculation is
not a justification for imposing a categorical exclusion of investor fraud claims.
A similar example is the citation to AHW Inv. P’Ship v. Citigroup, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 2d
510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The AHW claim involved the hypothetical sale of publicly traded stock.
AWH was decided on New York law regarding investment fraud set forth in Starr Found. v. Am.
Int'l Grp., Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 4526, 76 A.D.3d 25, 901 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1st Dept.).
The Starr case explained that damage claims based on a lost hypothetical market value violated
New York’s “out of pocket” rule for damages arising from fraud. 907 N.Y.S.2d at 249. The
rationale is that the “out of pocket rule” allows compensation for what was lost, not what might
have been gained. Id. Again, this does not advocate for a categorical exclusion of investment fraud
cases, it just focuses on the damages. Moreover, because the Investor Recovery claims involve
the return of a fixed principal balance rather than any hypothetical market value, such claims would
not be barred, even under New York law.

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY AND RESPONSE BRIEF
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The Hopkins Associates present no good reason
investment fraud claims under the Idaho

to allow a categorical exclusion

common law. The current common law rules

of

adequately

govern fraud claims.
D. The District Court Erred in Determining the Standard Regarding, and Excluding
Evidence 0f the Scope 0f the Hopkins Associates’ Duty T0 Disclose
Investor Recovery has previously argued that the District Court was too narrow in

0n the applicable
that they

test for

determining

When a duty t0

disclose exists.

“d0 not understand” the point 0f the appeal.

The point

its

ruling

Hopkins Associates contend
is

simply

this: the

Hopkins

Associates duties arising under applicable securities laws formed a sufﬁcient basis for an “other

.

.

relation of trust

29-30.)

E.

The point

and confidence” Which
is

may

.

(Opening Br. pp.

give rise t0 a duty t0 disclose.

adequately addressed in the Opening Brief.

On Remand The

Court Should Reverse the Exclusion 0f the Testimony 0f R. Wayne

Klein

Hopkins Associates frame the appeal with respect
materiality.

That

is

not necessarily correct.

to R.

Wayne

Klein as being limited to

Investor Recovery also has appealed the District

Court’s refusal t0 allow the Hopkins Associates securities laws obligations to be presented in

support of the establishment of the duty to disclose. If the District Court

is

reversed, Mr. Klein

is

qualiﬁed t0 present expert testimony regarding the securities laws obligations 0f the Hopkins
Associates.

(See

EX

143).

Whether the court on remand would allow

provide that information by way 0f instruction,
is

reversed.

is

that testimony, or

would

a matter yet to be determined ifthe District Court

Investor Recovery does not intend t0 waive

its

potential proffer of

Mr. Klein’s

testimony for that purpose.

With respect

t0 the

pending argument that Mr. Klein’s testimony

materiality 0f the omissions, the

is

Hopkins Associates are twisting the Watts

relevant t0 the

v.

Krebs

test

0f
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subjective materiality in order to argue that Mr. Klein’s proffered testimony

Subj ective materiality exists Where “the maker of the representation

that

recipient regards or

its

is

action, although a reasonable

(1998).

knows

is

not relevant.

0r has reason t0

know

likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice

man would not

so regard

it.”

131 Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387, 391

However, the Hopkins Associates are misstating the

materiality requires a

showing

material. (Resp. Cross

App. Br,

p. 29).

That

is

test. First,

man “would

that a reasonable

0f

they assert that the

test

0f

not” consider a nondisclosure

simply wrong. The subjective materiality

test is

simply not dependent upon Whether information meets the “reasonable man” expectation. 131
Idaho 616, 620, 962 P.2d 387, 391 (1998). Second, they assert that subjective materiality is limited
to “actual”

knowledge of the person making the omission; but

the “or has reason t0

know” language 0f

Watts.

that is also

See 131 Idaho

at

wrong because

it

ignores

620, 962 P.2d at 391.

The Hopkins Associates only present a strawman argument

that asserts that Klein’s

testimony does not establish the Hopkins Associates’ “actual knowledge” of the individual
investor’s “actual” understanding 0r intent.

Recovery

in

its

opening

materiality test as

do not

F.

brief, Klein’s proffered

deﬁned by

Watts.

(Opening Br.

directly challenge this analysis.

testimony

is

However,

On remand,

that is not the test.

testimony
p. 3 1-33).

is

As explained by Investor

relevant t0 the actual subjective

The Hopkins Associates,

the court should be instructed that Mr. Klein’s

relevant to the issue 0f materiality and should be allowed t0 be presented at

The Court Erred Dismissing

trial.

the Claims Against Hopkins Financial Services Inc.

In response t0 Investor Recovery’s argument

on appeal regarding the dismissal 0f Hopkins

Financial Services Inc., the Hopkins Associates d0 not dispute the evidence 0r that
material question of fact.

in effect,

it

raises a

Rather, Hopkins Associates attempt to circumvent the argument

alleging that, procedurally, the evidence wasn’t “properly presented” to the court.

by

However, the
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Record shows

argument and evidence was properly presented

that the

t0 the District

Court on

summary judgment.
The evidence presented
citation,

was contained

in three afﬁdavits

Richardson ﬁled 3/31/2017 (Sealed R.
5/24/2017 (Sealed R.

p.

and the attached documents:

p.

(1) the

Afﬁdavit of Aubrey

3948-4605); (2) the Afﬁdavit 0f Wyatt Johnson ﬁled

4798-4958); and (3) the Afﬁdavit 0f Wyatt Johnson ﬁled 9/22/2017 (R.

1752-1893). (See R. p. 1590-1625.) This

p.

Court and argued by Investor Recovery, With

to the District

the

is

same portion 0f the record identiﬁed

in Investor

Recovery’s argument on appeal (Opening Br. 33-38.) In the court below, as well as on appeal,
Investor recovery cited t0 the contents Within those afﬁdavits

deposition transcripts

by page and

The Hopkins Associates
don’t say What

is

missing.

Most

by referencing

the exhibits and/or

line.

allege that portions of the cited materials are missing, but they

likely that

is

an oversight on their part arising from the fact that

the 3/31/2017 Richardson Afﬁdavit and 5/24/2017 Johnson Afﬁdavit are contained in the sealed

portion 0f the record, rather than in the

The one exception

is

trial

court 0n

record.4

the speciﬁc reference t0 trial exhibits that

Hopkins Financial Services,
the

main chronological

Inc. letterhead.

summary judgment, but

Admittedly, not
the Court

all

show correspondence 0n

0f the

was pointed

correspondence in the record was 0n Hopkins Financial Services

trial

exhibits

the

were before

to the fact that all the

Inc. letterhead. (R. p. 1594).

This

blanket reference seemed appropriate because the only letterhead used for Hopkins Northwest

Fund matters was Hopkins Financial Services

Inc. letterhead,

and the

fact

was never

disputed.

4

Investor Recovery was citing documents by their name and ﬁling date, because the Case Summary is organized
and appeared to correspond With the record as a Whole (R. p. 2-34). The sealed portion of the record was pulled out
0f order and attached in a later volume. Because the Record is now compiled as a single PDF, it initially seemed the
date and document identity reference was useful. Investor Recovery apologizes for any confusion 0r inconvenience

by

this oversight in the citation format.
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Notwithstanding, the correct reference t0 the record 0f such documents as were before the
court containing the letterhead

is

trial

R. pp. 1825, 1828, 1832, 1835, 1836, 1838, 1839, 1844, 1892,

1893 and Sealed R. pp. 4276, 4281, 4283, 4286, 4287, 4289 and 4290.

The Hopkins
District Court.

associates contend that Investor Recovery’s arguments

However,

Defendants Motion for

and

it

substantially contains the

documents cited

word

v.

in record. (R. p.

However,

this

its

to the

“Response

t0

Filed September 5, 2017”, on September 22, 2017,

same arguments

asserted

0n appeal, with reference

1590 — 1627).5 Granted, the argument 0n appeal

identical t0 the discussion below.

precision.

Investor Recovery ﬁled

that is also incorrect.

Summary Judgment

were not presented

The argument does have some

is

to all the

not word-for-

additional depth and

Court has recognized that arguments can and d0 evolve on appeal. State

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270-71 (2019). So long as the position

is

advanced

below and the substance 0fthe argument is the same, the argument is preserved 0n appeal. Investor
Recovery has “properly presented”

its

argument below, and to

this Court.

Aside from the procedural objections, the Hopkins Associates present n0 substantive
challenge t0 Investor Recovery’s argument that there

liability

ofthe

entity,

Hopkins Financial Services,

was a material question of fact regarding the

Inc.

Because ofthat question 0f fact, the

Court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the

entity.

District

That summaryjudgment decision

should be reversed.

G. The Court Should Reverse the

The

District Court’s

appeal and

is

Award

award 0f attorney

the sole issue raised in the

fees,

0f Attorney Fees.

below,

is

the subject of both Investor Recovery’s

Hopkins Associates’ cross appeal. The argument applies

equally to both appeals.

5

With the exception 0f the Hopkins Financial Service Inc., letterhead documents, Which Investor Recovery already
acknowledged were incorrectly cited t0 by trial exhibit number in the Opening Brief.
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Recent Decisions 0f This Court Conﬁrm

I.

Transaction

”

this

Case Does Not Involve a “Commercial

for Purposes ofl. C. S 12-1208).

After the opening brief 0f Investor Recovery and responsive brief 0f the Hopkins

Associates were ﬁled in this case, the Court decided First

Perce County, Ina, Docket N0. 46000, November

18, 2019.

Bank ofLincoln
The case

is

v.

Land

Title

ofNez

0n point, and necessitates

reversal 0f the attorney fee award, below.

Both below, and on appeal, Investor Recovery has pointed out

that this case does not

v.

New

Pipeline Corp, 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P. 3d 218, 223 (2001) (App. Opening Br. 39-41).

The

involve any “transaction” between the parties, as was required

Hopkins Associates,

and in

in response

their cross appeal, rely

by Great Plains Equip.

on Bryan Trucking,

Inc.

v.

Gier,

160 Idaho 422, 374 P. 3d 585 (2016) and contend that a commercial “transaction” need not exist
directly

between the

parties

The recent decision
between the
case, First

When

the claims are for fraud.

in First

Bank ofLincoln makes

parties t0 this case prevents

Bank of Lincoln had

clear that the lack

any award of attorney fees under

of a transaction

I.C. § 12-120(3). In that

a commercial loan agreement with a borrower, secured

borrower’s beneﬁcial interest of a commercial loan agreement with another party.
borrower’s third party loan was paid

off, the

escrow agent, Land

erroneously distributed funds t0 the borrower, rather than First

Title

by

the

When

the

of Nez Perce County

Bank of Lincoln.

First

Bank of

Lincoln pursued a claim as a third party beneﬁciary of the escrow agreement between the borrower

and Land

Title

0f Nez Perce County.

Despite the fact that

commercial transaction,

this

between the bank and the

all

parties plead that the First

Bank 0f Lincoln

case presented a

Court held fees were inappropriate because there was n0 “transaction”
title

company.

This Court recognized that even

if the

bank been
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successful in

is

its

claims that the

title

company injured

it,6

a legal theory of recovery against a party

not the same as a “transaction.” In that case, because the contract was not between the bank and

title

company, there was n0 basis

LC.

§ 12-120(3). First Bank

for an

ofLincoln

as a

“commercial transaction” under

Land Title ofNeZ Perce

County, Ina, Docket N0. 46000,

award 0f attorney fees
v.

p. 13.

In light 0f the rationale and analysis ofFirst

it

appears that Bryant Trucking

is

an

Bank ofLincoln and Great Plains Equipment,

The statement 0f decision

outlier.

at the

end of

that case

states:

Gier notes that Bryan Trucking's amended complaint alleged that Gier was acting
as an agent in fact for Ring, that Gier

had committed an actionable fraud against

Bryan Trucking, and that Gier had assumed a duty toward Bryan Trucking by
advising it regarding the truck. Although Gier was not a named defendant 0n the
three contract or quasi-contract claims alleged,
allege that Gier

was Ring's

Bryan Trucking,
analysis

was a party t0 the commercial transaction when it alleged that Gier
had defrauded Bryan Trucking, and owed Bryan Trucking a duty.

agent,

Inc.

v.

Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 427,

makes no sense because

”A person making

if Gier

374 P.3d 585, 590 (2016)(emphasis added). The

was an “agent,” he would not be a party to

535 P.2d 664, 669-70 (1975).

decision,

is

the transaction.

a contract with another as an agent for a disclosed principal does not

party t0 the contract.” Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.

97,

Bryan Trucking nonetheless did

What makes more

was decided on

that the decision

Turner

v.

Ins.

sense, but

become

a

Agency, 96 Idaho 691, 696-

which

is

less clear

the fact that the losing party,

from the

Bryan Trucking,

expressly alleged a “commercial transaction” under LC. § 12-120(3), and lost that claim. That fact

was speciﬁcally pointed out

in the recitation

only rationale that makes sense

is

that the

of case

facts.

160 Idaho

at

424, 374 P.3d at 590. The

award of fees was based on the losing party’s

allegation,

and not 0n the actual existence 0f a transaction. As previously argued, Investor Recovery has made

6

The bank was unsuccessﬁﬂ due

t0

its

extinguishment 0f any actionable debt through a

full price credit bid.
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no speciﬁc “commercial transaction” allegation (Am. Comp]. Filed 10/13/2017,
Bryan Trucking should not

dictate a

p. 32), therefore

ﬁnding of a “commercial transaction” as a basis for an award

of fess.
This case did not involve any transaction directly between the parties. There
for

an award of attorney fees for a “commercial transaction” under
2.

the investments at issue in this case

case cannot be

its

no basis

I.C. § 12-120(3).

Personal Savings Investments Should Not be Deemed “Commercial.

Investor Recovery has argued in

is

”

opening that the evidence in the case established that

were not motivated by a commercial purpose. Therefore,

deemed “commercial” based 0n

from Carillo

the rule

v.

this

Boise Tire C0. 152 Idaho

741, 756, 274 P. 3d 1256, 1271 (2012) that, in order for a transaction to be commercial both sides

must enter a transaction for a commercial purpose. (Opening Br.

4 1 -2). In response, the Hopkins

P.

Associates cite cases that they assert present similar facts Which resulted in ﬁndings of

“commercial” transactions. However, a close examination of those cases indicates that they do
not require this court t0 disregard the Carillo rule.

Hopkins Associates

assert that

Meyers

v.

Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 221 P.3d 81 (2009)

stands for the proposition that the act 0f investing

is

commercial, per

prospect 0f a return. The actual statement from the case

.

.

.

Meyers and her

late

se,

because

is:

husband invested nearly $ 300,000

in Ideal Consultants,

they believed was a legitimate attempt to build a revenue-generating program
as the Congressional Accountability Proiect. This

transaction and

Meyers

is

entitled t0 attorney fees

involves a

it

What

known

was a fraudulent commercial

under LC.

§ 12- 120(3) in

recouping

her losses.

Meyers

v.

Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 293, 221 P.3d 81, 91 (2009)(emphasis added). The decision

contains nothing else about the venture.

that the evidence

was

that the intent

From

the information presented in that case,

it

appears

of the parties in that matter was t0 build a business.

It

was

the
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intent,

for

not the fact that there was a loan, which directed that decision. Meyers presents no reason

ﬁnding

that the investors in this case

Clarke

Latimer, 437 P.3d

v.

1

were involved

t0 that case,

was

“commercial” venture.

(Idaho 2018), does not advance Hopkins Associates’

position. That case involved fraudulent transfers

court found that

in a

between a judgment debtor and

his spouse. This

a “noncommercial transfers of funds” between parties other than the parties

and afﬁrmed the denial 0f an award fees under LC.

§ 12-120(3).

Clarke does nothing

other than provide additional support for the requirement of a transaction directly between the

parties that is articulated in the First

Hopkins Associates ask

Bank ofLincoln

this court t0 construe

(2016) to hold that any activity involving income

was no so narrow

in that case.

In

is

case.

Stevens

v.

Eyer, 161 Idaho 407, 387 P.3d 75

“commercial,” per

se.

The Court’s

analysis

analysis, the court adopted a multi-factor deﬁnition of the

its

term “commercial:

The

adjective "commercial" means:

1. 0f,

relating t0, or characteristic of commerce.

commerce.

2.

engaged

3.

prepared, done, or acting with sole 0r chief emphasis 0n salability, proﬁt,

in

or success: a commercial product; His attitude toward the theater

is

very

commercial.
4. able t0 yield

0r

make

a proﬁt:

Stevens, 161 Idaho at 412, 387 P.3d at 80 (quoting Dictionary.com Unabridged.

Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/commercial (accessed:

income

is

a signiﬁcant factor,

it

is

Random House,

August 30, 2016)).

While

not the only factor. Actively engaging in commerce,

proactively participating in a business.

By comparison,

to passively generate interest cannot reasonably

i.e.

a personal savings account Which happens

be Viewed as engaging in commerce. Likewise,
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the investments in this case

were

The

entirely passive.

investors

had no

control.

Passive savings

investments cannot reasonably be Viewed as “commercial” transactions Where the investors have

n0 say 0r control
in

in the use

of the funds. In such a case, savings investors are simply not engaged

commerce.
3.

If an

Award ofFees Was

Permissible, the District Court’s Allocation

and Partially

Within the Court ’s Discretion, in Part,

The

District Court properly evaluated the

by evaluating
81.)

Of these

the factors listed in

factors, the

The

signiﬁcant.

District

IRCP

amount of the Hopkins Associates’

54(e)(3). (9/18/2018

element of “time and labor required” (IRCP 54(e)(3)(A)) was the most

Court concisely

broad generalizations, but,

summed up

rather, the fact that

counsel’s involvement required nearly as

— 78.) The

the issue: “This case

make

was

this

“a case that was days away from

many

fees

by prior counsel combined.”

(

and costs

statement based 0n

trial

t0 prepare for trial

9/ 1 8/2018

over-litigated.”

before current

by new counsel

Order RE: Attorney Fees, R. 3876

Court’s analysis correctly reﬂects the record. (See 7/16/2018 Aff. R. Faucher

R. 3345-3409; 7/16/2018 Aff.

RE

fee request

Order RE: Attorney Fees, R. 3875 —

(9/18/2018 Order RE: Attorney Fees, R. 3876.) The Court did not

as all the fees incurred

Was Properly

in Error.

M. Perison RE

RE Fees,

Fees, R. 3410-3432; 7/16/2008 Aff. P. Augustine

Fees, R. 3433-3450; 7/16/2008 Aff. H. Belodoff

RE

Fees, R. 3451-3471.)

Court’s ﬁndings regarding the duplication of efforts, the

initial

In light 0f the

reduction of

all

fees

by

approximately half was well reasoned and supported by the record.

The
at issue

further reduction t0 reﬂect the fact the Court’s

As previously argued by Investor Recovery,

was

that only a portion

of the claims

were “commercial transactions,” (assuming there are any “commercial transactions”)7 was

correct t0 the extent the Court recognized the

7

ﬁnding

it

need

t0 allocate, but incorrect in application.

Where

maintains that the Court’s ﬁnding 0f any “commercial transaction”

in error.
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a case involves both “commercial transaction” claims and claims outside the scope of I.C. § 12120(3), the Court

is

obligated to allocate fees so that only those incurred 0n the “commercial

transaction” are awarded. See, Brooks

v.

Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 77-78, 910 P.2d 744, 749-

50 (1996). However, where the fees are inseparably intertwined between claims upon which fees
can be awarded, and those upon Which fees are not awardable, the District Court properly denies

any award 0f fees.

The Hopkins Associates complain of the same

However, they point

Br. p. 53.)

separate the fees.

claim.

Id.

to nothing in the record that

In fact, the fees

would allow

the District Court to

were generally not identiﬁed With reference

(See 7/16/2018 Aff. R. Faucher

RE

RE

Belodoff RE Fees, R. 345 1-3471.) Therefore, even

if this

any individual

M. Perison RE

Fees, R. 3433-3450; 7/16/2008 Aff. H.

Court concludes there

transaction involved in this case, the District Court should not have

they cannot be determined from the record.

t0

Fees, R. 3345-3409; 7/16/2018 Aff.

Fees, R. 3410-3432; 7/16/2008 Aff. P. Augustine

& Cross. App

error. (Resp.

is

a commercial

awarded attorney fees because

The judgment would need

t0

be reversed for that

reason.

H. Attorney Fees 0n Appeal
For the reasons articulated in Investor Recovery’s opening brief (Opening Br.

p. 42),

no

attorney fees should be awarded 0n appeal.

III.

For the reasons

state

CONCLUSION

above, Investor Recovery requests that the Court:

a.

Reverse the directed verdict dismissing the claims against Randy and Brian;

b.

Reverse the summary judgment dismissing the claims against Hopkins
Financial;

c.

Vacate the judgments entered in

this

attorney fees) and remand the matter
Hopkins Financial;

matter (including the judgments for

for

new trial

against Randy, Brian and
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d.

Instruct the court,

0n remand,

disclose;

e.

on the

to instruct the jury

creating a duty of disclosure, in addition to the

securities laws

common law

duties to

and

Overrule the

trial

court’s

order in limine preventing presentation of
Klein and instruct the trial court on remand to

testimony by R. Wayne
consider the admission of Mr. Klein’s testimony in light 0f its probative
weight toward the issue 0f the materiality 0f the omissions at issue in this
case; or

f.

Altematively, in the absence of other

relief, overrule the trial court's award
of attorney fees and vacate the Amended Judgment awarding attorney fees
to Randy and Brian entered September 27, 20 1 8.

CV
DATED this 2

day of December, 2019.

W

ON
orn

or Appellant
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APPENDIX

IV.

DATE
July

1,

2005 —
Aug. 1,
2008

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION
FACT:
have

Investors invest in fund

RECORD

When managers

did not

actual discretion t0 denV investment withdrawal

reguests.

EVIDENCE:

Investment purchase documents

Ex.

7, 9, 11, 13, 16,

18, 20, 22, 24, 26,

28, 30, 32, 34, 36,

38

EVIDENCE:

Private Placement

Memorandum

sec. 16.4.B

Ex.

4, p. 32.

Ex.

7, 9, 11, 13, 16,

says that the “right 0f a debenture holder” t0 “require
redemption” is “subj ect to the ﬁght 0f the Issuer to declare
a moratorium

0n redemptions

.

.

.

if

one or more of the

following conditions exist:
a.

Sufﬁcient debenture holders give notice of

redemption under

this Section to

Management of the

cause

Issuer t0 have concern for

the liquidity of the Issuer and parity treatment

among
b.

There

debenture holders; or

all

is

any reason,

legal or otherwise,

(including a rise in interest rates) sufﬁcient that

from a practical matter, Management
determines in

new

its

sole discretion, that the sale of

“A” debentures

Series

principal being

redeemed

EVIDENCE: At each purchase,
expressly told in writing “this

is

is

to replace the

unlikely.

the investors

were

a 30-year debenture that

can be redeemed upon 120-days notice without any early
withdrawal penalty.” Alternatively stated, there was no
pending condition that would allow management to place a
moratorium on redemptions.

Aug.
2008

1,

18, 20, 22, 24, 26,

28, 30, 32, 34, 36,

38

FACT: Fund

circumstances change because “sufficient
debenture holders [gavel notice 0f redemption
t0
.

Management

.

.

have concern for the liquiditv
of the Issuer and paritv treatment among all debenture
holders.” At that time. the fund managers gained the
actual discretion to denv Withdrawal requests.
cause

.

.

.

to
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DATE

CITATION T0

DESCRIPTION
EVIDENCE:

RECORD

Starting July 2007, Withdrawal requests

EX. 47, 48, 49.2,
50.4

signiﬁcantly increased.

EVIDENCE:

In July

2007 a major loan

R. Hopkins Tr. p.

in the portfolio,

Hunters Point, defaulted and dramatically dropped yields.

500 L. 18 —

p.

501

L. 17; EX. 40, EX.

EVIDENCE:

August 2007, continuing though the
moratorium, the Fund borrowed in excess 0f its PPM
borrowing limits against dilution in order to pay

D. Reinstein

In

692
L.1

46

Tr. p.

22 — p. 710
EX. 54

L.
1;

redemption requests.

EVIDENCE: The

“critical factors” for the

management

determining whether to call a moratorium were:

in

R. Hopkins Tr. p.

483 L. 17 —

(a)

investor notices of intent to redeem; and (2) fund cash

p.

484

L. 4.

ﬂow.

EVIDENCE: Randy and Brian actually recognized the
changed circumstances and needed
withdrawing

their

money in

to stop investors

from

order t0 protect the Fund.

R. Hopkins Tr. p.

491, L1. 14-24; p.

493 L. 20 — 494 L.
7;

B.

Murphy prior

testimony,

Bankruptcy Tr. 820—2015 read into
record, Tr. p. 553 L.

2 —p. 557 L. 10;

EVIDENCE: The Fund

started

working

t0 stop investors

from Withdrawing money When they directed Carol Snyder
on the ﬁrst week of August 2007 to “convert” part of her
investment from a “debenture” t0 a “note,” rather than
withdraw her funds.

C. Snyder Tr. p. 989
L1.

22-25; p. 992 L.

— p. 995 L. 21,
Ex. 13; B. Murphy
Tr. P. 581
8 — p.
17

1.

583 L. 17

Aug. 2007-

FACT: Randv, Brian and Hopkins

Dec. 2007.

intentionally hide the fact that the

Financial

Fund management

has gained the authoritv to suspend withdrawals from
the investors.
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DATE

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION

RECORD

EVIDENCE: Randy and Brian implemented

a plan to

work

with investors 0n a “case by case” basis in order to try to
convince them to rescind or reduce redemption requests.

B.

Murphy prior

testimony,

Bankruptcy Tr. 820—2015 read into
record, Tr. p. 553 L.

2 —p. 557 L. 10; R.

Hopkins p. 491 L.
12 —p. 492 L. 1, p.
493 L. 20 — p. 494
L. 4.

EVIDENCE: The Fund did not reveal the number of

R. Hopkins Tr. p.

pending, outstanding redemption requests.

486

22 —

L.

p.

487

L. 5; see Ex. 71.

EVIDENCE:

In the ﬁrst week of August 2007, Carol
Snyderg met with Brian t0 request the withdrawal of her
money because she was concerned it was not secure.

Although the subject of the meeting was the security of
Ms. Snyder’s investments, Brian omitted any information
about management’s immediate active right to suspend
withdrawals. Brian allowed Ms. Snyder t0 continue with

had an unqualiﬁed
Withdraw her money with 120-days’ notice. After
the meeting Hopkins Financial and Brian repeated the
misleading statement that Ms. Snyder still had the
unqualiﬁed right to withdraw money with 120—days’ notice
in a follow up letter dated August 8, 2007.
the inaccurate understanding that she

C. Snyder Tr. p. 989
L.

22 —

p.

p. 993, L1.

990

L. 20,

1— 23, p.

22 — p. 995
L. 21; p. 996 L. 11 —
p. 997, L.7, p. 998
L. 4 —p. 999 L. 10;

994

L.

Ex. 13.

right to

8

Ms. Snyder invested

in her individual capacity,

and as the

trustee

of the

Van Hees Family Trust.

(C. Snyder, Tr.

pp. 978—980).
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DATE

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION
EVIDENCE:

RECORD

met With
Brian t0 discuss the security of the Fund because he was
thinking about investing a million more dollars with the
Fund in addition to his current investment. Although the
subject of the meeting was the security of the Fund
In October 2007, Larry Erickson9

L. Erickson Tr.

p.329-330,

p.

332

L.

— p. 336 L. 1, p.
337 L. 12 — p. 343
17

L. 13, EX. 36.

investments, Brian omitted any information about
management’s immediate active right to suspend
Withdrawals. Brian allowed Mr. Erickson (and by
extension, his wife Elizabeth Erickson) to continue with

had an unqualiﬁed
withdraw his money with 120-days’ notice. After
the meeting Hopkins Financial and Brian repeated the
misleading statement that Mr. Erickson still had the
unqualiﬁed right t0 Withdraw money with 120-days’ notice
in a follow up letter dated October 12, 2007.
the inaccurate understanding that he
right to

EVIDENCE:

In

December 2007

t0 speciﬁcally discuss

Bill Pugh met with Brian
an additional investment in the Fund

B.

Pugh Tr. p. 883
— p. 891 L. 5.

L. 10

which would need to be available for Withdrawal within 12
months. Although the subj ect of the meeting was Mr.
Pugh’s ability to withdraw investments in the future, Brian
allowed Mr. Pugh t0 continue With the inaccurate
understanding that she had an unqualiﬁed n'ght t0
withdraw his monei with 120-dais’ notice.
Aug. 2007-

FACT: The

abilitv to

withdraw

their

monev was

important t0 the investors. If thev learned that right
at risk when thev met with Brian, thev would and
could have withdrawn all 0f their monev.

Dec. 2007.

was

EVIDENCE: Ms. Snyder (individually and as trustee
the

for

Van Hees Family Trust) understood the redemption

and it was important to her. If she learned in the
August 2007 meeting that her ability t0 withdraw money
was at risk, she would have demanded full withdrawal.
The Fund had the capital and would have paid out their
investment. (Ms. Snyder and the trust have an outstanding
uncompensated balance of $740,583 The Fund paid out
$5,002,854.00 in redemptions requested after August 1,
feature

C. Snyder Tr. p. 996
L. 11

— p. 999

L. 10,

Ex. 436; EX. 135,
49.2

2007)

9

Larry and Elisabeth “Betsy” Erickson are married.

investments

when they make

As

a married couple they share information pertaining to their

investing decisions. (E. Erickson Tr. p. 1280 L. 19

-

p. 1281, L. 8).
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DATE

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION
EVIDENCE:

RECORD

Ericksons understood the redemption feature

and it was important t0 them. If they learned in the
December 2007 meeting that their ability to withdraw their
money was at risk, they would have demanded their
withdrawal. The Fund had the capital and would have paid

L. Erickson Tr. p.

337

L. 12

—p. 341,

L. 18; Ex. 137, 139,

49.2

out their investment. (Erickson had $233,820 invested that

they could not Withdraw. The Fund paid out $2,663,043.00

on redemptions requested

after

November

1,

2008).

EVIDENCE: Pughs understood the redemption feature and

B.

was important to them. If they learned in the December
2007 meeting that their ability t0 withdraw their money
was at risk, they would have demanded their Withdrawal.
The Fund had the capital and would have paid out their
investment (Pughs had $413,015 invested. The fund paid

L.

it

Ex

Pugh Tr. p. 888
2 — p. 890 L. 25;
459; EX. 49.2.

out $1,760,849.00 0n redemptions requested after January
1,

Feb. 29,

2008

2008).

FACT: At investor meeting Hopkins

Associates

mention, but dismiss the possibilitv 0f a moratorium bv
making false assurances t0 investors that
the Fund will continue honoring all redemption
intentionallv

reg uests.

EVIDENCE:

Ex. 43, p.

Presentation states:

“If investors desire redemptions, Issuer

(HNWF)

will

INV REC

002705.

continue to honor those requests in accordance with the

memorandum.
However, should desired investor redemption requests
exceed Issuer’s available cash
this

may

ﬂow to pay those requests,

cause the issuer t0 declare a moratorium.”

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT’S REPLY AND RESPONSE BRIEF
— PAGE 27

DATE

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION
EVIDENCE: The

RECORD

“cautionary” language of the

Ex.

4, p. 32.

presentation merely duplicates the substance of the general

language of the Private Placement
“right

memorandum —

of a debenture holder” t0 “require redemption”

is

“subject to the right of the Issuer to declare a moratorium

on redemptions

.

.

.

one 0r more 0f the following

if

conditions exist:
Sufﬁcient debenture holders give notice of

c.

redemption under

this Section to

Management of the

cause

Issuer to have concern for

the liquidity of the Issuer and parity treatment

among
There

all

debenture holders; or

any reason, legal or otherwise,
(including a ﬁse in interest rates) sufﬁcient
from a practical matter, Management

d.

is

determines in

new

Series

its

EVIDENCE:

sole discretion, that the sale of

“A” debentures

principal being

that

redeemed

is

to replace the

unlikely.

Immediately before the meeting, the Hopkins

Ex. 72.

knew they were planning t0 declare a
moratorium. Brian (a member of the management team)
Associates

admitted t0 others that “I believe that

all redemptions will
be suspended in Hopkins Northwest Fund on 02—28-08.

The

size

of [your] redemption

is

not the issue

it is

the

cumulative amount of the redemptions and the cash
availability.

EVIDENCE: March meeting minutes conﬁrm Brian and

Ex

Randy’s actual belief that disclosure 0f a potential
moratorium t0 investors would cause “too much panic.”

Tr. p.

Randy testiﬁed

that withholding the information

Hopkins
489 L. 21 — P.

73; R.

493 L. 24.

was a

“business decision.”

Mar.

1,

FACT: Fund management effectivelv

2008 —

full

forward

date, there

stopped giving

redemptions after Februarv 29, 2008. As 0f that
was n0 longer anv wav for investors t0 avoid

injury.
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DATE

CITATION TO

DESCRIPTION
EVIDENCE:

In the

two years prior

t0 the

RECORD
February 29,

Ex. 49.2

2008 meeting, nearly every redemption request submitted
t0 the Fund was paid in full.

EVIDENCE:

Following the February 29, 2008 meeting,
only 2 out 0f 15 new redemption requests were paid in full.

EVIDENCE: On March

14,

2008 When Ms. Snyder called

Brian t0 follow up 0n a $237,000 redemption payment that

was due

the prior

give her the

December, he told her the Fund could not

money and would only give Ms. Snyder

Ex. 49.2

C. Snyder Tr. p. 999

—p. 1000 L.
16, p. 1006 L. 10 —
p. 1010 L. 7.
L. 11

$ 1 50,000.

EVIDENCE:

Ericksons asked for a redemption in April of

Ex. 93; L. Erickson

2008. In June they were told they would get almost

Tr. p.

nothing.

354

349 L. 25-p.

L. 21; Ex. 94.
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